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Abstract 
There is a widely held view in the astronomical community that unmanned robotic 
space vehicles are, and will always be, more efficient explorers of planetary surfaces 
than astronauts (e.g. Coates, 2001; Clements 2009; Rees 2011). Partly this is due to a 
common assumption that robotic exploration is cheaper than human exploration 
(although, as we shall see, this isn’t necessarily true if like is compared with like), and 
partly from the expectation that continued developments in technology will 
relentlessly increase the capability, and reduce the size and cost, of robotic missions 
to the point that human exploration will not be able to compete. I will argue below 
that the experience of human exploration during the Apollo missions, more recent 
field analogue studies, and trends in robotic space exploration actually all point to 
exactly the opposite conclusion.   
 
Benefits of human space exploration 
 
As demonstrated by the Apollo missions forty years ago, and leaving aside the 
question of cost (which is not straightforward and which I address separately below), 
human space exploration has a number of advantages over robotic operations on 
planetary surfaces. These have been discussed in detail elsewhere (e.g. Spudis 2001; 
Crawford 2001, 2010; Garvin 2004; Cockell 2004; Snook et al. 2007), and were 
endorsed by the independent Commission on the Scientific Case for Human Space 
Exploration commissioned by the RAS in 2005 (Close et al., 2005; hereinafter ‘the 
RAS Report’). These advantages may briefly be summarised as follows: 
 
• On-the-spot decision making and flexibility, with increased opportunities for 
making serendipitous discoveries; 
 
• Greatly enhanced mobility and attendant opportunities for geological 
exploration and instrument deployment (compare the 35.7 km traversed in 
three days by the Apollo 17 astronauts in December 1972 with the almost 
identical distance (34.4 km) traversed by the Mars Exploration Rover 
Opportunity in eight years from January 2004 to December 2011); 
 
• Greatly increased efficiency in sample collection and sample return capacity 
(compare the 382 kg of samples returned by Apollo with the 0.32 kg returned 
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by the Russian robotic sample return missions Lunas 16, 20 and 24, and the 
zero kg returned to-date by any robotic mission to Mars); 
 
• Increased potential for large-scale exploratory activities (e.g. drilling) and the 
deployment and maintenance of complex equipment; and 
 
• The development of a space-based infrastructure capable of supporting space-
based astronomy and other scientific applications (e.g. the construction and 
maintenance of large space telescopes). 
 
 
 
With the exception of the final bullet point, for which the best demonstration is 
provided by the five successful space shuttle servicing missions to the HST (e.g. NRC 
2005), demonstration of the benefits of human spaceflight for planetary exploration 
must be sought in a comparison of the relative efficiencies of the Apollo missions and 
robotic missions to the Moon and Mars, supported where appropriate with terrestrial 
analogue studies.  
 
The relative efficiency of human over robotic exploration of planetary surfaces is in 
fact well recognized by scientists directly involved with the latter on a day-to-day 
basis. For example, regarding the exploration of Mars, the RAS Report noted that: 
 
“the expert evidence we have heard strongly suggests that the use of 
autonomous robots alone will very significantly limit what can be 
learned about our nearest potentially habitable planet” (Close et al. 
(2005; paragraph 70). 
 
Putting it more bluntly, Steve Squyres, the Principal Investigator for the Mars 
Exploration Rovers Spirit and Opportunity, has written: 
 
“[t]he unfortunate truth is that most things our rovers can do in a perfect 
sol [i.e. a martian day] a human explorer could do in less than a minute” 
(Squyres, 2005, pp. 234-5). 
 
This is of course only a qualitative assessment, albeit by someone well placed to make 
an informed judgement. Nevertheless, taken at face value it implies a human/robot 
efficiency ratio of about 1500, which is far larger than the likely ratio of cost between 
a human mission to Mars and the cost of the MERs (see below). Even this, however, 
does not fairly compare human exploration efficiency with robotic exploration. This is 
because much of the scientific benefit of human missions will consist of samples 
returned, drill cores drilled and geophysical instruments deployed, all of which were 
demonstrated by Apollo on the Moon, but none of which have been achieved by the 
MERs nor will be achieved by the more capable (and vastly more expensive) Mars 
Science Laboratory (MSL) that is due to land on Mars in 2012. 
 
More objective estimates of the relative efficiency of robots and humans as field 
geologists have been given by Garvin et al. (2004) and Snook et al. (2007). Garvin 
(2004) summarised the results of a NASA survey of several dozen planetary scientists 
and engineers on the relative efficiency of human and robotic capabilities in 18 
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different skill sets relevant to planetary exploration. The results are summarised in 
Figure 1, and show a clear balance in favour of human capabilities (with the implicit 
recognition that the most efficient exploration strategies of all will be those consisting 
of human-robotic partnerships where each complements the other).  
 
This conclusion is corroborated by direct field comparisons of human and robotic 
exploration at planetary analogue sites on Earth. Snook et al. (2007) reported the 
results of one such study, conducted at the Haughton impact crater in the Canadian 
arctic, where the efficiency of a human explorer (suitably encumbered in a spacesuit) 
was compared with that of a tele-operated rover (controlled from NASA Ames 
Research Centre in California) in the performance of a range of exploration tasks. The 
rover was more sophisticated than those employed in present-day space missions, and 
included simulation of artificial intelligence capabilities that are only likely to be 
incorporated in actual space missions from 2015 at the earliest. Nevertheless, the 
space-suited ‘astronaut’ was found to be much more efficient in performing 
exploration tasks than the rover, and Snook et al. (2007; p. 438) concluded that: 
“humans could be 1-2 orders of magnitude more productive per unit time in 
exploration than future terrestrially controlled robots.”   
 
Although this estimate is an order of magnitude lower than Squyres’ off-the-cuff 
estimate of 1500 given above, this is mainly because the comparison was conducted 
between human and tele-robotic exploration, rather than between humans and 
supervised quasi-autonomous robotic exploration such as carried out by the MERs 
and MSL. Tele-robotic exploration is known to be more efficient than autonomous 
robotic operation, precisely because real-time human interaction is involved, but it 
cannot be employed effectively on planetary surfaces more distant than the Moon 
owing to the inevitable communications delay (Lester and Thronson 2011). Garvin 
(2004, see his Fig. 2) has compared the efficiencies of robotic, tele-robotic, and 
human exploration, from which it is clear that if humans are ‘1-2 orders of magnitude 
more efficient’ than tele-robots then they will be even more efficient when compared 
with robotic vehicles like the MERs or MSL, bringing the two estimates into better 
agreement. 
 
Moreover, as noted above, comparisons based on the relative time taken to perform 
certain tasks, while they do indeed show humans to be more efficient than robots, 
nevertheless still grossly underestimate the added scientific value of having humans 
on planetary surfaces. This is because astronauts have to come back to Earth, and can 
therefore bring large quantities of intelligently collected samples back with them. 
Robotic explorers, on the other hand, generally do not return (this is one reason why 
they are cheaper!) so nothing can come back with them. Even if robotic sample return 
missions are implemented, neither the quantity nor the diversity of these samples will 
be as high as would be achievable in the context of a human mission -- again compare 
the 382 kg of samples (collected from over 2000 discrete locations) returned by 
Apollo, with the 0.32 kg (collected from three locations) brought back by the Luna 
sample return missions. The Apollo sample haul might also be compared with the 
≤0.5 kg generally considered in the context of future robotic Mars sample return 
missions (e.g. ISAG, 2011). Note that this comparison is not intended in any way to 
downplay the scientific importance of robotic Mars sample return, which will in any 
case be essential before human missions can responsibly be sent to Mars, but merely 
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to point out the step change in sample availability (both in quantity and diversity) that 
may be expected when and if human missions are sent to the planet.  
 
 
Bibliometrics 
 
If, as argued above, human exploration of planetary surfaces is really scientifically so 
much more efficient than robotic exploration then we would expect to see this 
reflected in the scientific literature. As the only human exploration missions 
conducted to-date were the Apollo missions, any such bibliometric comparison must 
be between publications based on Apollo data and those based on various robotic 
missions to the Moon and Mars. With this in mind, Figure 2 shows the cumulative 
number of refereed publications recorded in the SAO/NASA Astrophysics Data 
System (ADS) resulting from the six successful Apollo landings, the three Luna 
sample return missions (Lunas 16, 20, 24), the two tele-operated Lunokhod rovers 
(Lunas 17, 21), the five successful Surveyor lunar soft landers, and the two MERs 
(Spirit and Opportunity) on Mars. Those interested will find more details of the search 
parameters in the accompanying box. 
 
Several things are immediately apparent from Figure 2. Most obvious is the sheer 
volume of Apollo’s scientific legacy compared to the other missions illustrated. This 
alone goes a long way to vindicate the points made above about human versus robotic 
efficiency. The second point to note is that the next most productive set of missions 
are the lunar sample return missions Lunas 16, 20 and 24, which highlights the 
importance of sample return. Indeed, a large part of the reason why Apollo has 
resulted in many more publications than the Luna missions is due to the much larger 
quantity and diversity of the returned samples which, as we have seen, will always be 
greater in the context of human missions. The third point to note is that, despite being 
based on data obtained and samples collected over 40 years ago, and unlike the Luna, 
Lunokhod, or Surveyor publications, which have clearly levelled off, the Apollo 
publication rate is still rising. Indeed, it is actually rising as fast as, or faster than, the 
publications rate derived from the Mars Exploration Rovers, despite the fact that data 
derived from the latter are much more recent. No matter how far one extrapolates into 
the future, it is clear that the volume of scientific activity generated by the MERs, or 
other robotic exploration missions, will never approach that due to Apollo. 
 
However, to my mind, the most staggering thing about Figure 2 is that this enormous 
scientific legacy is based on a total of only 12.5 days total contact time with the lunar 
surface. Note that this is the total cumulative time the Apollo astronauts were on the 
Moon, including down time in the Lunar Module, not the cumulative EVA time 
which was only 3.4 days (Orloff and Harland, 2006). This may be compared with a 
total of 436 active days on the surface for the Lunokhods (Wilson 1987) and 5162 
days for the Mars Exploration Rovers (to the end of 2011, allowing for the fact that 
contact was lost with Spirit on 22 March 2010). This comparison is made graphically 
in Figure 3, which shows the cumulative number of publications divided by days of 
fieldwork on the surface (adopting 12.5 days for Apollo to allow for a fair comparison 
with the rovers). This is the same as dividing the cumulative number of publications 
by the number of sites studied up to a given date and the average days of fieldwork 
per site. Dips in the cumulative curves occur when a new mission arrives, 
instantaneously increasing the days of fieldwork before this has fed through to 
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increased publications. Note the logarithmic scale -- by this metric, Apollo was over 
three orders of magnitude more efficient in producing scientific papers per day of 
fieldwork than are the MERs. Coincidentally or otherwise, this is essentially the same 
as Squyres’ (2005) intuitive estimate given above, and is fully consistent the more 
quantitative analogue fieldwork tests reported by Snook et al. (2007). 
 
Human exploration costs 
 
Although it is generally taken for granted that human exploration is more expensive 
than robotic exploration, and this is certainly true if the aggregate costs are the only 
ones considered, the situation is not as clear cut as it is sometimes made out to be. For 
one thing, the ratio of costs between human and robotic missions, while large, may 
nevertheless be smaller than the corresponding ratio in scientific productivity. The 
Apollo missions are instructive in this respect. Wilhelms (1993) and Beattie (2001) 
estimated a total cost of Apollo as $25 billion 'in 1960's money'. This is rather more 
than the actual Congressional appropriations for Apollo ($19.4 billion from 1961 to 
1973; tabulated by Orloff and Harland 2006). Taking the higher estimate (to be 
conservative) and taking '1960s' to be 1966 when Apollo expenditure peaked, this 
corresponds to about $175 billion today (where I have made use of the US Bureau of 
Statistics Inflation Calculator; http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm).  
 
It is interesting to compare this with the cost of a modern state-of-the-art robotic 
mission, like Mars Science Laboratory. MSL, which at this writing is en route to 
Mars, has cost an estimated $2.5 billion (Leone 2011). Thus, in real terms, Apollo 
cost 70 times as much as MSL. However, Apollo visited six sites, whereas MSL will 
only visit one site, so in terms of cost per site Apollo was only 12 times as expensive 
as MSL yet each Apollo mission was vastly more capable. It is true that this 
comparison only strictly holds in the context of lunar exploration, where we can 
compare Apollo with a hypothetical future MSL-like lunar rover; in the context of 
Mars exploration, human missions seem likely to be more expensive than Apollo in 
real terms (although not necessarily by a large factor -- the estimated total costs of 
some human Mars mission architectures are comparable to that of Apollo, or even 
lower; e.g. Turner, 2004). The main point is that human missions like Apollo are 
between two and three orders of magnitude more efficient in performing exploration 
tasks than robotic missions, while being only one to two orders of magnitude more 
expensive. In addition, human missions can accomplish scientific objectives which 
are unlikely to be achieved robotically at all (deep drilling and properly representative 
sample collection and return are obvious examples, as well as the increased 
opportunities for serendipitous discoveries). Looked at this way, human space 
exploration doesn’t look so expensive after all!   
 
That said, there is a more sophisticated and productive way to view the relative costs 
of human and robotic spaceflight.  The fact is that while robotic planetary missions 
are science-focussed, and essentially their whole costs are therefore borne by 
scientific budgets, human spaceflight is not wholly, or even mainly, science-driven. 
Rather, the ultimate drivers of human spaceflight tend to be geopolitical concerns, 
industrial development and innovation, and employment in key industries. Thus, 
science can be a beneficiary of human missions instituted and (largely) paid for by 
other constituencies. Apollo again provides an excellent example. As is well known, 
Apollo was instituted for geopolitical rather than scientific reasons, and to first order 
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the US Government’s expenditure of $25 billion ($175 billion today) would have 
occurred anyway, whether any science was performed or not. Fortunately, owing 
largely to the efforts of a relatively small number of senior scientists (documented by 
Beattie 2001) scientific objectives and capabilities were incorporated into Apollo and, 
as outlined above, this has resulted in a rich scientific legacy that is still being 
exploited today.   
 
Of course, including science in Apollo did not come entirely free of cost, and it is 
interesting to compare this additional, strictly scientific, investment with the cost of 
robotic missions that were, and are, demonstrably less capable than a human 
programme like Apollo. Beattie (2001) has conducted a careful study of the cost of 
including science in Apollo (including the Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment 
Packages (ALSEPs), grants to the ALSEP investigators, construction of the Lunar 
Receiving Laboratory in Houston, grants to the initial tranch of lunar sample 
investigators, astronaut ALSEP and geological training, etc), and arrived at a figure of 
$350 million in 1972 dollars (somewhat higher than other published estimates). 
Beattie does not explicitly include the additional cost of developing the Lunar Roving 
Vehicle ($37 million), but this should probably be added as the LRV was included in 
the last three Apollo missions mainly to enhance geological exploration. Thus we 
arrive at a total scientific cost in Apollo of $387 million in 1972 dollars. This 
corresponds to about $2.09 billion today, or 1.2 percent of the total Apollo budget. 
 
Comparison with robotic exploration costs 
 
It is instructive to compare this with the costs of some past and planned robotic 
missions. It is sometimes difficult  to get reliable estimates for these, but a search of 
various internet sources gives $265 million for Mars Pathfinder (which landed on 
Mars in 1997), $820 million for the two Mars Exploration Rovers (landed in 2004 and 
considering only the first 90 days of operations), and, as noted above, $2.5 billion for 
Mars Science Laboratory. Again employing the US Bureau of Statistics Inflation 
Calculator, these correspond to $374 million, $982 million, and $2.5 billion in 2011 
dollars. For comparison, according to a NASA Planetary Sciences Decadal Survey 
Steering Committee report available on the Web (Li and Hayati 2010), the estimated 
cost of the proposed Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission, which hopefully will occur 
around 2025, is about $6.5 billion These mission costs are compared in Figure 4, from 
which two points are immediately obvious: 
 
(1) The cost of the robotic exploration of Mars has not been decreasing as 
technology advances, but rather has been increasing steadily (Fig. 4). There is 
a good reason for this -- planetary surfaces are large, rough, rugged places, not 
at all amenable to exploration with small, cheap rovers no matter how much 
‘intelligence’ can be built into them. There isn’t much point in having a hyper-
intelligent rover the size of a matchbox if it can only travel 5 meters a day and 
gets stuck every time it encounters a rock the size of an orange! Nor is such a 
vehicle likely to carry much in the way of instrumentation. As a consequence, 
rovers have got bigger and more expensive (and of course more capable) with 
time (Fig. 5). This is exactly opposite to the trend predicted by some (e.g. Rees 
2011), but it is one which will have to continue if we persist in trying to 
explore planetary surfaces with robots. The problem is, the rising costs may 
soon be unsustainable within purely scientific budgets  
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(2) In real terms, the cost of Mars Science Laboratory ($2.5 billion) already 
exceeds the additional cost of flying science on Apollo ($2.09 billion in 
today’s money). In fact, as Apollo visited six different sites on the Moon, the 
cost of science per site ($348 million in 2011 dollars) is actually less than the 
cost of any of these robotic Mars missions and, as described above, the 
scientific efficiency was incomparably higher. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The lesson seems clear: if at some future date a series of Apollo-like human missions 
return to the Moon and/or are sent on to Mars, and if these are funded (as they will be) 
for a complex range of socio-political reasons, scientists will get more for our money 
piggy-backing science on them than we will get by relying on dedicated autonomous 
robotic vehicles which will, in any case, become increasingly unaffordable.  
 
Fortunately, there is a way forward. In 2007 the World’s space agencies came 
together to develop the Global Exploration Strategy (GES), which lays the 
foundations for a global human exploration programme which could provide us with 
just such an opportunity (GES 2007). One of the first fruits of the GES has been the 
development of a Global Exploration Roadmap (GER 2011), which outlines possible 
international contributions to human missions to the Moon, near-Earth asteroids and, 
eventually, Mars. The motivations for the GES are, needless-to-say, multifaceted, and 
include a range of geopolitical and societal motivations (many of them highly 
desirable in themselves) in addition to science.  
 
From the above discussion, it ought to be clear that science would be a major 
beneficiary of participating in a human exploration programme such as envisaged by 
the Global Exploration Strategy. Quite simply, this will result in new knowledge, 
including answers to fundamental questions regarding the origin and evolution of 
planets, and the distribution and history of life in the Solar System, that will not be 
obtained as efficiently, and in many cases probably not obtained at all, by reliance on 
robotic exploration alone.  
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BOX: Bibliometric search details 
 
The bibliometric statistics shown in Figs 2 and 3 were obtained from the SAO/NASA 
ADS database. The searches were restricted to refereed publications only. It is likely 
that these statistics underestimate the total number of publications resulting from 
these missions, especially for Apollo, as some sample analysis work has been 
published in geological and petrological journals not normally included in the ADS 
(although, through the efforts of the library of the Lunar and Planetary Institute (LPI), 
the ADS should be complete up to about 1995 when the LPI Lunar Bibliography was 
turned over to the ADS; M.A. Hager, personal communication, 2011). I have made 
use of the ADS here principally because of its ease of use, and because it is a well-
respected bibliometric database in the astronomical community.  
 
The Apollo publications were retrieved by searching for papers containing the words 
“Apollo” AND “Moon” in the title or abstract (including “Moon” was necessary to 
exclude papers referring to the Apollo asteroids). These were then examined to check 
that they do indeed relate to the Apollo missions. Similarly, the Surveyor papers were 
retrieved by searching for “Surveyor” AND “Moon” (where this time “Moon” was 
included to exclude references to surveys unrelated to the Surveyor missions). The 
Luna 16/20/24 and Lunokhod publications were retrieved by searching for these 
missions by name. Finally, the MER publications were retrieved by searching for 
[((“Spirit” OR “Opportunity”) AND (“rover” OR “Gusev” OR “Meridiani”)) OR 
“Mars Exploration Rover”]; this slightly complicated set of search criteria was 
rendered necessary to avoid the surprisingly large number of papers reporting work 
conducted in such and such a “spirit” or which provide great “opportunities” for 
various things unrelated to Mars exploration! A check was made against the MER 
Science Team’s own publication list 
(http://marsrover.nasa.gov/science/pdf/web_publist.pdf) to ensure that these papers 
were correctly recovered by the ADS search criteria (although the Team papers are 
only a subset of the total number of papers making reference to the MERs included in 
Fig. 2, this agreement gives confidence that a large number of MER papers have not 
been missed in the ADS search). 
 
Doubtless more sophisticated bibliometric analyses could be performed, and this 
might be an interesting exercise for someone, but the results shown in Figures 2 and 3 
appear sufficient for present purposes. 
------------------------- 
 
 
FIGURES 
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Figure 1. Tabular summary of exploration skills reported by Garvin (2004). The 
fourth column indicates relative advantage of humans or robots on a sliding scale: 
green symbols indicate that the balance of advantage lies with humans, red with 
robots, and yellow that both are approximately equal. In most cases humans have a 
clear advantage. Since 2004 the extreme endurance of the MERs has moved this entry 
more in favour of robots, but they remain slow and inflexible. (Figure courtesy of Jim 
Garvin/NASA/Springer, and reproduced with permission.) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Cumulative number of refereed publications in the ADS database for the 
Apollo, Luna 16/20/24, Lunokhod, Surveyor, and Mars Exploration Rover missions 
(see Box for details). 
 11
 
Figure 3. Cumulative number of refereed publications per day exploring the surface 
of the Moon or Mars. This is the same as dividing the cumulative number of 
publications by the number of sites visited by a given date and the average time spent 
at those sites. The plot is restricted to those missions plotted in Fig. 2 which had, or 
have, surface mobility, and which can therefore be considered as having performed 
‘fieldwork’.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Estimated costs of robotic Mars rover missions expressed in constant 2011 
dollars. Note that there were two MERs so the individual cost of each would be less 
than the plotted value (but perhaps not by much given the economies of scale inherent 
in producing two rather than one); as currently conceived, MSR requires two rovers 
(possibly including ESA’s ExoMars) in addition to other expensive elements). The 
curve is a 2nd order polynomial fit to the trend – for how much longer will this be 
sustainable within purely scientific budgets? Note that this is not an inflationary 
increase (real-terms costs are plotted): we could continue to build rovers as small and 
(relatively) cheap as Pathfinder, but choose not to owing to their inherent scientific 
limitations. 
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Figure 5.  The increasing size of Mars rovers, from Pathfinder (centre), the MER’s 
(left), to MSL (right). This increase in size (and cost), which is exactly opposite to 
predictions that improved technology will result in smaller and cheaper robots, is 
mandated by the nature of the Martian surface and complexity of exploration 
objectives. Human missions would be even larger and more expensive, but, crucially, 
much more capable (NASA/JPL). 
